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OPINION 
____________ 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case comes to us following a jury verdict in favor 
of Brand Marketing Group, LLC. The jury found Defendant 
Intertek Testing Services, N.A., Inc. liable to Brand for 
negligent misrepresentation and awarded Brand more than $6 
million in total damages—$1,045,000 in compensatory and 
$5 million in punitive damages. After an adverse ruling on its 
post-trial motions, Intertek filed this appeal from the District 
Court’s final order. We will affirm. 
 3 
 
I 
A 
 Brand is a small company founded in 2004 by David 
Brand.1 Until about 2008, Brand sold vent-free heaters—
products that provide gas heat without having to vent 
outdoors—made by a company called ProCom. At that point, 
Brand began developing the Thermablaster, a vent-free heater 
that purportedly improved on ProCom’s design.  
 Through some industry contacts, Brand was introduced 
to a Chinese company called Reecon M&E Co., Ltd. that 
would manufacture the Thermablasters. Reecon, in turn, 
suggested that Brand use Intertek to test the heaters to ensure 
they met U.S. safety standards. Intertek, an international 
product-testing company with more than 35,000 employees, 
had an ongoing relationship with Reecon, and Reecon wanted 
to extend that relationship to include the Thermablasters.  
 Before accepting Reecon’s testing suggestion, David 
Brand did some research. He attended a trade show where he 
spoke with two Intertek representatives who indicated that 
their company could test the Thermablasters. He also received 
and examined a promotional leaflet and visited the company’s 
website, which indicated that Intertek could test to any 
standard promulgated by the American National Standards 
Institute (ANSI). Later, he exchanged emails with the trade 
show representatives, who suggested that the Thermablasters 
be tested at Intertek’s facility in China.  
                                                 
 1 Where the difference between company and owner 
matters, we refer to the latter by his first and last names; 
otherwise, we refer to them as “Brand” interchangeably. 
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 Satisfied that Intertek and its China facility had the 
expertise to do the testing, Brand allowed Reecon to use 
Intertek to test the heaters. Reecon then applied to have the 
Thermablasters tested by Intertek, stating on its application 
that the heaters should be tested against the most recent 
applicable ANSI standard (Z.21.11.2b), and that “BMG”—
Brand Marketing Group—was the ultimate buyer of the 
heaters. Although Reecon contracted with and paid Intertek 
about $22,000, the cost of testing was passed through to 
Brand as part of the per-unit price Reecon charged Brand for 
the heaters.  
 Having established manufacturing and testing 
programs for its product, Brand struck a deal in April 2011 
with Ace Hardware Corp., which agreed to pay Brand some 
$467,000 for 3,980 Thermablasters. Three months later, 
Intertek tested the heaters and found that they met the ANSI 
standard. Shortly after testing was completed, David Brand 
visited China to monitor production. While he was there, 
Reecon gave Brand a Test Data Sheet—an Intertek document 
signed by several of its engineers—showing that the heaters 
had passed all relevant tests. Satisfied that the heaters 
complied with the applicable standard, Brand bought 5,500 
heaters from Reecon, and delivered the Thermablasters to 
Ace within a couple of months.  
 Ace began selling the heaters in late 2011 but halted 
sales permanently after ProCom—the company whose 
products Brand had formerly sold—notified Ace that the 
Thermablasters did not meet ANSI standard Z.21.11.2b. 
Brand initially defended its product, pointing to Intertek’s 
Test Data Sheet as evidence that the heaters met the ANSI 
standard. Because the heaters were actually noncompliant, 
however, Ace refused to sell them and demanded that Brand 
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repossess the heaters and refund its payment. Brand could do 
neither, as the company lacked the means to retrieve the 
heaters and had already spent the funds it received from Ace. 
As a result, Ace sued Brand and obtained a default judgment 
for about $611,060 (Ace’s purchase price plus interest and 
costs), thus wiping out Brand’s anticipated profit of about 
$147,000.  
 Brand then sued Intertek alleging, inter alia, fraudulent 
and negligent misrepresentation. Intertek countersued, 
alleging trademark infringement (among other claims) 
because Brand had placed Intertek’s testing certification 
mark—which indicates to consumers that Intertek has 
certified that a product meets applicable safety standards—on 
Thermablaster boxes prior to receiving Intertek’s permission 
to do so. During pretrial proceedings, Intertek bought Ace’s 
$611,060 judgment against Brand for $250,000. Intertek 
aggressively tried to collect its judgment in the weeks leading 
up to trial, attempting, among other tactics, to transfer the 
judgment from the company to David Brand personally.  
 Before trial, Brand withdrew its fraudulent 
misrepresentation claim. As relevant to this appeal, the parties 
proceeded to trial on the negligent misrepresentation and 
trademark infringement claims. 
B 
 During the three-day trial held in March 2014, the jury 
heard testimony from several witnesses, including Intertek’s 
chief engineer for heating products, Frederick Curkeet. 
Curkeet testified that vent-free heaters posed “a big risk in 
terms of overheating and carbon monoxide poisoning” in 
consumers’ homes if they did not meet safety standards and 
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that he knew Intertek’s customers relied on their testing 
results. App. 772. Despite that understanding, Curkeet 
admitted that Intertek lacked a “complete process” to ensure 
that Intertek’s facilities around the world tested consistently 
to ANSI standards. Nor did Intertek share “best practice[s]” 
among facilities, even though Curkeet acknowledged that 
such knowledge-sharing would be ideal. App. 802. Moreover, 
Curkeet stated that in the past “quite a number [of Intertek] 
engineers” had been caught “slacking off on the job and 
saying things complied without running the test,” though he 
maintained that Intertek always fired those employees 
promptly. App. 842.  
 Curkeet also testified that, although ANSI standard 
Z.21.11.2b was written in English, Intertek did not translate it 
for the Chinese engineers who tested the Thermablaster. 
Intertek didn’t do so, he said, because the standard’s 
engineering jargon didn’t translate well from English to 
Chinese. The company decided not to translate even though 
the Chinese engineers’ English was imperfect: as Curkeet 
noted, “it’s obvious it’s not their first language,” and 
“sometimes the language issues do creep into the 
documentation.” App. 800–01. In regard to the Thermablaster 
testing, he agreed that “something got lost in translation.” 
App. 802. Furthermore, Curkeet stated that Intertek had never 
before tested to Z.21.11.2b and that training and experience in 
the China facility were lacking. He said that although he was 
on the ANSI committee that wrote the applicable standard, he 
did not directly supervise the Chinese engineers who tested 
the heaters. Had he done so, Curkeet stated, Intertek would 
not have erroneously certified the Thermablasters.  
 At the close of trial, the District Court instructed the 
jury that it could award punitive damages to Brand if it found 
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that Intertek’s conduct was outrageous, even though Brand’s 
claim was for negligent, not fraudulent, misrepresentation. 
The jury did just that, returning a verdict for Brand in the 
amount of $6,045,000. That figure included $725,000 in past 
compensatory damages, $320,000 in future compensatory 
damages, and $5 million in punitive damages. The jury also 
found for Intertek on the trademark infringement claim but 
awarded no damages because the infringement was not 
willful.  
C 
 After the jury verdict was announced, Intertek moved 
for post-trial relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 
and 59. It requested (1) judgment as a matter of law or a new 
trial on the punitive damages claim because Brand had not 
shown that Intertek had acted recklessly; (2) a reduction in 
punitive damages because the award violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) a reduction in 
compensatory damages because Brand had shown only about 
$320,000 in actual loss; (4) a new trial because the jury 
verdicts on Brand’s claim and Intertek’s counterclaim were 
inconsistent; (5) a set-off to the judgment equal to the 
judgment against Brand that Intertek had purchased from 
Ace; and (6) a new trial because of allegedly erroneous 
evidentiary rulings by the District Court. The District Court 
granted the requested set-off but denied the remainder of 
Intertek’s motion. Intertek filed this timely appeal. 
II 
 Brand is a limited liability company, so its citizenship 
“is determined by the citizenship of its members.” VICI 
Racing, LLC v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 763 F.3d 273, 282 (3d 
 8 
 
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Because its owner David Brand 
is a citizen of Pennsylvania, the company is likewise a citizen 
of Pennsylvania. Intertek is a citizen of New York and 
Delaware, and the amount in controversy is more than 
$75,000. The District Court therefore had diversity 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and removal from state 
court (where this case originated) was proper under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1441. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
III 
 Intertek raises several arguments that we shall address 
in order of importance. First, we consider Intertek’s argument 
that Brand’s case was foreclosed by the economic loss 
doctrine. We then analyze Intertek’s various challenges to the 
damages awards: that (1) the compensatory award was legally 
improper; (2) the compensatory award was factually 
irrational; (3) punitive damages are per se unavailable for 
negligent misrepresentation; (4) the District Court lacked a 
factual basis on which to issue a punitive damages jury 
instruction; and (5) the punitive damages award violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, 
we assess the consistency of the jury’s verdicts.  
A 
 Intertek claims that Brand’s negligent 
misrepresentation claim was barred by Pennsylvania’s 
economic loss doctrine. This is a purely legal question, so we 
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s holding that 
an exception to the economic loss doctrine permitted the 
claim. Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 867 (3d Cir. 2013). The 
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parties agree that Pennsylvania law applies. Erie R.R. Co. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).  
 The economic loss doctrine “provides that no cause of 
action exists for negligence that results solely in economic 
damages unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” 
Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 
175 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Adams v. Copper Beach 
Townhome Cmtys., L.P., 816 A.2d 301, 305 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2003)). Notwithstanding the general rule, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania has recognized an exception specifically for 
negligent misrepresentation claims. In Bilt-Rite Contractors, 
Inc. v. Architectural Studio, 866 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2005), the 
court expressly adopted Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552. 
Id. at 285. Section 552 provides: 
(1) One who, in the course of his business . . . 
[negligently] supplies false information for the 
guidance of others in their business 
transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary 
loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance 
upon the information . . . . 
(2) [This liability] is limited to loss suffered 
(a) by the person or one of a limited 
group of persons for whose benefit and 
guidance he intends to supply the 
information or knows that the recipient 
intends to supply it; and  
(b) through reliance upon it in a 
transaction that he intends the 
information to influence or knows that 
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the recipient so intends or in a 
substantially similar transaction. 
 Intertek acknowledges the Bilt-Rite exception, but 
argues that § 552 is unavailing to Brand because it was not in 
the “limited group” of people “for whose benefit and 
guidance” Intertek provided information. Specifically, 
Intertek contends that the information David Brand received 
from its website could not have been the basis of a valid 
negligent misrepresentation claim because information on the 
Internet is provided to the public, not to a limited group. And 
it argues that a valid claim could not be based on the Test 
Data Sheet because that information was provided to Reecon, 
not Brand directly (even though Brand eventually received it).  
 Even if Intertek is correct that a website cannot 
provide the foundation for a negligent misrepresentation 
claim, it is wrong that the Test Data Sheet could not do so. 
Intertek urges us to read § 552 to mean that a negligent 
misrepresentation claim is viable only when a defendant 
provides information directly to a plaintiff. We decline to do 
so because that reading is contradicted by the plain text of 
§ 552(2)(a), which permits claims by a third party when a 
professional provides information and “knows that the 
recipient intends to supply it” to the third party. That is 
precisely what happened here: Intertek knew that Reecon was 
not the only party relying on its testing information based on 
Reecon’s testing application that listed “BMG” as a buyer of 
the Thermablasters.  
 In any event, the Bilt-Rite exception applies even if 
Intertek did not know that “BMG” meant that Brand was the 
buyer of the heaters, as it asserts in its reply brief. In 
discussing its rationale for adopting § 552, the Pennsylvania 
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Supreme Court noted that an information supplier’s liability 
for negligent misrepresentation does not depend on the 
supplier’s knowledge of the recipient’s identity: 
[W]ith fewer generalists and more experts 
operating in the business world, business 
persons have found themselves in a position of 
increasing reliance upon the guidance of those 
possessing special expertise. Oftentimes, the 
party ultimately relying upon the specialized 
expertise has no direct contractual relationship 
with the expert supplier of information, and 
therefore, no contractual recourse if the supplier 
negligently misrepresents the information to 
another in privity. And yet, the supplier of the 
information is well aware that this third party 
exists (even if the supplier is unaware of his 
specific identity) and well knows that the 
information it has provided was to be relied 
upon by that party. Section 552 . . . hold[s] such 
professionals to a traditional duty of care for 
foreseeable harm. 
Bilt-Rite, 866 A.2d at 286 (emphasis added).  
 As Bilt-Rite makes clear, Intertek didn’t need to know 
that Brand, specifically, would rely on its testing data for § 
552 to apply. Instead, Intertek needed to know only that 
somebody aside from Reecon would rely on it—and, given 
that Reecon’s testing application listed multiple parties as 
“Buyer[s]” of the Thermablasters, it certainly knew that 
much. Therefore, the District Court correctly permitted 
Brand’s negligent misrepresentation claim to proceed under 
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Pennsylvania’s Bilt-Rite exception to the economic loss 
doctrine. 
B 
 Intertek next contends that the jury’s compensatory 
damages award—$725,000 for past damages and $320,000 
for future damages—was excessive. We apply a mixed 
standard of review to this issue. We review de novo whether 
the District Court applied the appropriate measure of 
damages. VICI Racing, 763 F.3d at 283. But if the District 
Court committed no legal error, our factual review of a 
compensatory damages award is “exceedingly narrow”—we 
will not disturb a jury’s decision “so long as there exists 
sufficient evidence on the record, which if accepted by the 
jury, would sustain the award.” Cortez v. Trans Union, LLC, 
617 F.3d 688, 718 (3d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).  
1 
 The gist of Intertek’s legal argument regarding 
compensatory damages is this: Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 552B governs damages awards for negligent 
misrepresentation, and it permits damages only for actual 
losses, which do not include “benefit-of-the-bargain” 
damages or lost profits. Because all but $320,368 (the amount 
Brand paid Reecon for the heaters) of Brand’s losses were 
something other than “actual,” Intertek argues, we must 
reduce the jury’s compensatory award to that amount. 
 Section 552B describes the damages recoverable for 
negligent misrepresentation as: 
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(1) . . . [T]hose necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff for the pecuniary loss to him of which 
the misrepresentation is a legal cause, including 
(a) the difference between the value of 
what he has received in the transaction 
and its purchase price or other value 
given for it; and 
(b) pecuniary loss suffered otherwise as a 
consequence of the plaintiff’s reliance 
upon the misrepresentation. 
(2) the damages recoverable for a negligent 
misrepresentation do not include the benefit of 
the plaintiff’s contract with the defendant. 
Comment b to that section explains that § 552B “rejects, as to 
negligent misrepresentation, the possibility that . . . the 
plaintiff may also recover damages that will give him the 
benefit of his contract with the defendant.” Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 552B cmt. b. 
 Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly 
adopted § 552 in Bilt-Rite, it has yet to adopt § 552B. Nor 
have the parties cited any cases from Pennsylvania appellate 
courts so holding. Despite this “dearth of Pennsylvania case 
law explaining damages recoverable under a cause of action 
for negligent misrepresentation,” Merrill Iron & Steel, Inc. v. 
Blaine Constr. Corp., 2014 WL 2993774, at *7 (W.D. Pa. 
July 2, 2014), we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court would adopt § 552B. Neither Intertek nor Brand 
encourages us to look elsewhere for the applicable law and, 
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given § 552B’s close relationship with § 552, we see no 
reason to do so either. 
 Intertek argues that Brand cannot recover the benefit 
of its Ace contract or other lost profits (presumably from 
potential future deals with Ace) under § 552B. The District 
Court disagreed, noting that § 552B(2) and comment b “only 
prohibit[] a plaintiff from realizing the benefit of its contract 
with defendant, here Intertek, presumably because such 
damages are recoverable under the alternative theory of 
breach of contract.” Brand Mktg. Grp., LLC v. Intertek 
Testing Servs. NA, Inc., 2014 WL 2094297, at *21 (W.D. Pa. 
May 20, 2014). According to the District Court, Section 552B 
permitted Brand to recover the benefit of its bargain with 
Ace, a non-defendant third party. In response, Intertek 
counters that “[a] party’s affairs cannot be subdivided so 
finely” to distinguish between the benefit of a bargain with a 
defendant and the benefit of a bargain with a third party. 
Intertek Br. 30. “The benefit to a manufacturer of its 
relationship with a retailer,” it argues, “is indivisible from the 
benefit of its relationship with a vendor. From either 
perspective, the benefit is the profit from its business.” Id. 
 In our view, Intertek’s failure to explain why such 
benefits are indistinguishable in light of § 552B makes its 
argument unpersuasive. Intertek asks us to conclude that 
when § 552B excises “the benefit of the plaintiff’s contract 
with the defendant” from negligent misrepresentation 
damages, it actually means to preclude all lost profits that a 
plaintiff might suffer as a result of a defendant’s 
misrepresentation. Yet Intertek provides no reason why we 
should predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
adopt § 552B but decline to give meaning to all of its words. 
Reading that section as Intertek urges would render “with the 
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defendant” meaningless in § 552B(1)(b) and in comment b. 
Such a reading is unsound as a matter of both logic and 
textual interpretation. Cf. Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 
(2004) (“A statute should be construed so that effect is given 
to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or 
superfluous, void or insignificant . . . .” (quoting 2A Norman 
J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 (rev. 
6th ed. 2000) (alteration in original))). 
 We agree with the District Court that, while § 552B 
prohibits a plaintiff from recovering the benefit of its bargain 
with the defendant in a negligent misrepresentation case, it 
allows such a plaintiff to recover the lost benefit of a contract 
formed with an entity other than the defendant. And we can 
conceive of no principled reason to believe that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt § 552B—as 
Intertek urges—yet effectively read the words “with the 
defendant” out of it. Accordingly, we predict that  the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt § 552B and 
interpret it as allowing benefit-of-the-bargain damages (and 
lost profit damages) in a negligent misrepresentation case 
except when those lost profits stem from a plaintiff’s contract 
with the defendant. 
2 
 Because the District Court did not err in identifying 
and interpreting the applicable legal standard, we next 
consider whether the jury’s award was rational, keeping in 
mind that our standard of review of a jury’s compensatory 
award is “exceedingly narrow.” Cortez, 617 F.3d at 718. If 
both parts of the jury’s award—$725,000 for past and 
$320,000 for future damages—are supported by some 
evidence in the record, we must uphold the award. 
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 The jury’s future damages award was supported by the 
facts. At trial, Brand called an accounting expert to testify 
regarding its lost future profits. He testified that the amount 
that Brand had lost due to Intertek’s misrepresentations was 
somewhere between $439,000 and $1 million over the next 
decade. The jury reduced that range to $320,000 because the 
expert’s analysis did not fully persuade them. Juries may 
discount evidence based on credibility determinations, and 
that’s exactly what happened here. 
 The past damages award of $725,000 was likewise 
rational. Absent Intertek’s misrepresentation that the 
Thermablasters met the ANSI standard, Brand would have 
learned of the safety issues with the heaters prior to large-
scale production; at that point, David Brand testified, those 
problems would have been “very easy” to fix. App. 943. The 
jury therefore could have rationally concluded that, but for 
Intertek’s tort, the problems with the Thermablasters would 
have been resolved at little cost to Brand. Brand then would 
have fulfilled its contract with Ace and made, as the 
accounting expert testified, a profit of about $147,000. This 
profit was the difference between $467,276 (the amount 
Brand received from Ace pursuant to their contract) and 
$320,368 (the amount Brand paid Reecon for the 
Thermablasters). Instead of earning that profit, however, 
Brand wound up owing a $611,060 judgment (an amount 
equal to Ace’s purchase price plus costs and interest) when it 
delivered the faulty heaters to Ace.  
 Compensatory damages “are intended to redress the 
concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct.” Cooper Indus., Inc. v. 
Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
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v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
Here, the jury’s past compensatory damages award did just 
that. The award canceled out the $611,060 judgment against 
Brand (and provides for interest and costs incurred by Brand 
in pursuing its rights against Intertek). By effectively 
eliminating that judgment (a “concrete loss” to Brand), the 
past compensatory award restored Brand to the position it 
would have been in absent Intertek’s tort—with a net profit 
on the Ace contract of about $147,000. For the reasons stated 
previously, we believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
would permit recovery of such benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages. Accordingly, the past compensatory award, like the 
future compensatory award, was rational, and the District 
Court did not err in allowing it to stand.  
C 
 Intertek argues that the jury’s $5 million punitive 
damages award was improper on three separate grounds. 
First, it argues that punitive damages are per se unavailable 
for negligent misrepresentation claims. Alternatively, it 
claims there was no factual basis for the District Court to 
instruct the jury on punitive damages in this case. Finally, it 
argues that even if the instructions were proper, the jury’s 
punitive award violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. We consider each argument in turn. 
1 
 Intertek contends that a Pennsylvania jury may never 
award punitive damages in a negligent misrepresentation 
case. We exercise plenary review over this legal question. 
Addie, 737 F.3d at 867; Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 
126 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997). As the District Court 
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correctly acknowledged, this argument presents a narrow 
question of first impression, as neither our Court nor the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has addressed whether 
punitive damages are available for negligent 
misrepresentation claims.  
 Our analysis of this argument does not begin on a 
blank slate, though. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
held that punitive damages may be awarded in negligence 
cases if the plaintiff proves greater culpability than ordinary 
negligence at trial. Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 
A.2d 766, 773 (Pa. 2005). In Hutchison, the court stated that 
while a showing of ordinary negligence cannot support a 
punitive damages award, “neither is there anything in law or 
logic to prevent the plaintiff in a case sounding in negligence 
from undertaking the additional burden of attempting to prove 
. . . that the defendant’s conduct not only was negligent but 
that the conduct was also outrageous,” such that it warrants 
punitive damages. Id. at 772. “The penal and deterrent 
purpose served by . . . punitive damages is furthered when the 
outrageous conduct occurs in a case sounding in negligence 
no less than when an intentional tort is at issue.” Id. 
 Against that background, Intertek asks us to declare 
that negligent misrepresentation claims are so different from 
other “case[s] sounding in negligence” that they can never be 
grounds for punitive damages awards in Pennsylvania. In 
effect, Intertek requests us to predict that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court would create an exception specifically for 
negligent misrepresentation cases to the general rule it 
announced in Hutchison. We decline to do so. 
 As with its primary compensatory damages argument, 
Intertek’s claim that punitive damages are per se unavailable 
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for negligent misrepresentation claims under Pennsylvania 
law is based on Restatement § 552B. It argues that punitive 
damages are unavailable for such claims because § 552B 
authorizes only compensatory damages. Although Intertek is 
correct that § 552B does not expressly authorize punitive 
damages— it states instead that a negligent misrepresentation 
plaintiff may recover damages “necessary to compensate the 
plaintiff for the pecuniary loss to him of which the 
misrepresentation is a legal cause,” Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 552B(1)—its argument is still mistaken.  
 Unlike Intertek, we ascribe no significance to that 
section’s omission of punitive damages. In fact, it would be 
unusual if § 552B did specifically indicate that punitive 
damages are available for negligent misrepresentation. By 
definition—and unlike compensatory damages—punitive 
damages are left to the discretion of the jury and need not be 
defined on a tort-by-tort basis. Accordingly, the Restatement 
defines punitive damages generally, untethered to any 
individual tort, as “damages, other than compensatory or 
nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for 
his outrageous conduct and to deter . . . similar conduct in the 
future.” Id. § 908. While punitive damages may not be 
awarded for actions that “constitute ordinary negligence,” 
§ 908 (like § 552B) gives no indication that any specific tort 
falls outside the realm of those for which punitive damages 
may be awarded. Id. § 908 cmt. b.  
 Our view is supported by Restatement § 549, which 
defines the damages available for fraudulent 
misrepresentation—an intentional tort for which Intertek 
concedes that punitive damages are available—and likewise 
makes no mention of punitive damages. Instead, that section 
authorizes a plaintiff to recover compensatory damages: “the 
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pecuniary loss to him of which the misrepresentation is a 
legal cause.” Id. § 549. The fact that the fraudulent 
misrepresentation section of the Restatement also fails to 
mention punitive damages strongly suggests that § 552B’s 
similar omission is of no import. Section 552B does not, as 
Intertek claims, foreclose punitive damages for negligent 
misrepresentation. 
  In addition to its § 552B argument, Intertek tries to 
distinguish Hutchison by arguing that unlike the plaintiff in 
that case, who sued an employer for negligent supervision 
and could not have sued for an intentional tort, Brand could 
have sued for intentional (that is, fraudulent) 
misrepresentation. It fails to explain, however, why this 
difference matters. The nonexistence of a related intentional 
tort claim is not a prerequisite to obtaining punitive damages 
pursuant to a negligence claim. Punitive damages may be 
awarded in Pennsylvania for reckless conduct, Hutchison, 870 
A.2d at 770–72—that is, conduct less culpable than 
intentional or willful action. A plaintiff can sue for negligence 
and prove recklessness, yet still be unable to prove intent, as 
the Hutchison court implicitly acknowledged. This is true 
irrespective of the existence of a parallel intentional tort. 
 Hutchison announced a broad rule for punitive 
damages in the negligence context: “We see no reason . . . to 
distinguish between claims sounding under Section 317 [of 
the Restatement, the section setting forth the elements of the 
negligent supervision claim at issue in Hutchison] and other 
actions sounding in negligence for purposes of punitive 
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damages.”2 Id. at 773. Giving due regard to that opinion, we 
likewise refuse to conjure a strained distinction between 
Section 552 claims and all other negligence claims. We 
therefore hold that Hutchison generally permits a plaintiff to 
undertake the additional burden of proving the heightened 
culpability required to sustain a punitive damages claim in 
negligence suits—and in negligent misrepresentation cases 
specifically. “It may be that, as a practical matter, it proves 
more difficult to sustain a claim for punitive damages [in a 
negligence case] . . . . But, that is a matter for proof that 
attends the particular case . . . .” Id. 
2 
 Intertek argues that even if punitive damages are 
available for negligent misrepresentation claims in 
Pennsylvania, the District Court’s decision to instruct the jury 
on punitive damages was not rationally based on facts 
adduced at trial. Although in most situations we review the 
decision to give a jury instruction for abuse of 
discretion, Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F. 3d 426, 439 
(3d Cir. 2009), our Court has chosen a different path when the 
jury instruction at issue is one regarding punitive damages, so 
                                                 
 2 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Hutchison 
about two months after it decided Bilt-Rite, which opened the 
door to negligent misrepresentation cases in Pennsylvania. 
Given the cases’ temporal proximity, if the Hutchison court 
didn’t intend for its holding to apply broadly to all negligence 
actions—including those authorized just two months earlier 
by Bilt-Rite—it likely would have said so, perhaps by noting 
that the availability of punitive damages for negligence is a 
question that needs to be evaluated on a claim-by-claim basis. 
It made no such statement. 
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we review this decision de novo, Alexander v. Riga, 208 F.3d 
419, 430 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 In Pennsylvania as elsewhere, “[t]he state of mind of 
the actor is vital” in determining whether punitive damages 
may be awarded. Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa. 
1984). “Ordinary negligence . . . will not support an award of 
punitive damages. Rather, to justify an award of punitive 
damages, the fact-finder must determine that the defendant 
acted with a culpable state of mind, i.e., with evil motive or 
reckless indifference to the rights of others.” Hutchinson v. 
Penske Truck Leasing Co., 876 A.2d 978, 983–84 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2005) (citation omitted). Brand does not contend that 
Intertek acted with evil motive, so the question is whether 
there was sufficient evidence in the record showing that 
Intertek acted with reckless indifference such that a punitive 
damages instruction was permissible. 
 It takes a special type of recklessness to justify 
punitive damages in Pennsylvania. “[A] punitive damages 
claim must be supported by evidence sufficient to establish 
that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk 
of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he 
acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious 
disregard of that risk.” Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 772. That 
“conscious disregard” is critical: “[A]n appreciation of the 
risk is a necessary element of the mental state required for the 
imposition of [punitive] damages.” Martin v. Johns-Manville 
Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1097 n.12 (Pa. 1985), abrogated on 
other grounds by Kirkbride v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 
A.2d 800 (Pa. 1989). For our Court to uphold the District 
Court’s decision to instruct the jury on punitive damages, 
therefore, we must find evidence in the record that Intertek 
actually knew its conduct was placing Brand at risk of harm.  
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 The District Court pointed to several pieces of 
evidence that, in its view, showed the recklessness that 
merited a punitive damages instruction. That evidence 
included: (1) Intertek’s lack of experience testing to the 
specific ANSI standard applicable to the Thermablaster and 
its lack of disclosure about that inexperience; (2) Curkeet’s 
testimony that he helped write ANSI Z.21.11.2b and knew 
how complicated it was, yet only loosely oversaw the China 
facility responsible for testing to it; (3) the language issues 
arising from the lack of translation at the China facility; (4) 
the testimony of a defense expert that the China facility had 
committed major errors in testing; and (5) Intertek’s reference 
to an incorrect standard—one that regulates barbecue grills, 
not heaters—in the footer of a testing form.   
 Intertek’s argument, reduced to its essence, is that the 
evidence simply did not show the subjective knowledge of 
risk that is required to support a punitive damages instruction 
in Pennsylvania. We disagree. Curkeet’s testimony, in 
particular, allowed the jury to find not only that a reasonable 
person would have recognized the risk of harm to Brand 
caused by Intertek’s misrepresentations, but also that Intertek 
was actually aware of that risk. As the man ultimately 
responsible for testing heating-related products, Curkeet knew 
that such products pose serious risks to consumers if they are 
faulty. He knew that manufacturers and consumers relied on 
Intertek’s testing. Nevertheless, Intertek lacked a “complete 
process” to ensure that its facilities performed tests correctly 
and consistently. App. 802. Despite that deficiency, and 
although Curkeet knew that Intertek’s operations would be 
improved if its facilities around the globe shared best 
practices with each other, Intertek took no steps to improve its 
procedures and thereby reduce risk.  
 24 
 
 The evidence related to language-barrier issues 
provided further support for a punitive damages instruction. 
Although it was “obvious” that Intertek’s Chinese engineers 
had problems with English, App. 800, the company chose not 
to provide translations of complicated, technical safety 
standards to them, despite the fact that those engineers were 
directly responsible for ensuring that the standards were met.3  
The risks inherent in that decision came to fruition when 
“something got lost in translation” in the Thermablaster 
testing. App. 802. And this wasn’t a one-time issue—Curkeet 
acknowledged that engineers had been caught slacking off 
and failing to fully test products in the past.  
 Curkeet’s testimony about his experience drafting the 
ANSI standard is further evidence of subjective recklessness. 
He knew that the applicable standard was new and that 
Intertek had not yet tested to it. Moreover, because he was on 
the drafting committee, he had firsthand knowledge of the 
standard. Yet he chose not to supervise the China facility and 
did not instruct them to call him immediately if any problems 
arose. The resulting harm to Brand was avoidable; had 
Curkeet more closely supervised the China facility, he 
testified, the testing problems would not have occurred.  
 To summarize, Intertek knew that its testing was 
critical to the economic welfare of manufacturers and the 
                                                 
 3 Intertek argues that it didn’t translate the standards 
because doing so can result in “lost jargon.” Intertek Br. 41. 
But that argument is counterproductive: the fact that Intertek 
consciously chose not to provide translations shows that 
Intertek had subjective awareness of Brand’s (and other 
customers’) risk of harm as a result of the language issues. It 
recognized that risk and proceeded in spite of it. 
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health of consumers. It knew that its testing process had 
holes, and it knew that problems had arisen in the past as a 
result. It knew that it had not yet tested to ANSI Z.21.11.2b, a 
standard Curkeet helped author. And it knew that its Chinese 
engineers might have difficulties understanding the standard 
because it was written in English. In the face of these 
compounding risks, Intertek chose to proceed without 
instituting additional precautions or process redesigns. In 
other words, the company subjectively knew of, and 
consciously disregarded, a risk of harm to Brand.  
 The District Court stated in its post-trial opinion that 
“Intertek admitted during trial that it knew or had reason to 
know of the high degree of risk” its actions led to. Brand 
Mktg. Grp., 2014 WL 2094297, at *14. As Intertek correctly 
points out, having reason to know of a risk is not enough, 
under Pennsylvania law, to support a punitive damages 
award. “Instead, [Pennsylvania] requires the more culpable 
mental state of conscious indifference to another’s safety . . . . 
There must be some evidence that the person actually realized 
the risk and acted in conscious disregard or indifference to it.” 
Burke v. Maassen, 904 F.2d 178, 182 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Martin, 494 A.2d at 1097). We find the District Court’s 
misstatement in this regard harmless. An error is harmless “if 
it is highly probable that [it] did not affect the outcome of the 
case.” McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 
917 (3d Cir. 1985). Here, the District Court’s legal 
misstatement almost certainly had no effect on the outcome of 
the case—Curkeet’s testimony, in particular, showed that 
Intertek was actually aware that inadequate testing placed 
Brand at a risk of harm and that it consciously chose not to 
mitigate that risk. 
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 Intertek also criticizes the District Court’s 
characterizations of certain facts. But to the extent that the 
Court mischaracterized relevant facts, those 
mischaracterizations also were harmless. For example, the 
District Court stated that Intertek “tested to wholly 
inapplicable safety standards,” using a barbecue grill standard 
rather than the correct one. Brand Mktg. Grp., 2014 WL 
2094297, at *15. The record doesn’t bear that characterization 
out—Curkeet’s testimony, which was uncontradicted on this 
point, indicates that the China facility used an old document 
template and forgot to change the document’s footer, but 
ultimately tested to the correct standard. And the District 
Court, in discussing testimony of Intertek’s general counsel, 
stated that that testimony would have allowed a jury to find 
that “the goal of the business dealings between the parties 
(from [Intertek’s] perspective) was to make it ‘painful’ and 
‘personally difficult’ for [Brand].” Id. at *2. As Intertek 
points out, the witness never acknowledged that he had made 
any statement to that effect; in fact, he denied recalling any 
such conversation. Even if Intertek is correct that the District 
Court erred in discussing both facts, though, those errors were 
harmless given the numerous other pieces of evidence 
evincing Intertek’s knowledge and disregard of risk that were 
presented at trial. 
 That evidence, while perhaps less than a smoking gun, 
provided a sufficient factual basis to support an instruction 
regarding punitive damages to the jury. The District Court did 
not err in giving that instruction.  
3 
 Intertek’s final challenge to the punitive damages 
award is a constitutional one. Even if the District Court 
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correctly interpreted the facts and Pennsylvania law as 
authorizing an instruction on punitive damages, Intertek 
argues, the jury’s award violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. In our “role as 
gatekeeper” we review de novo a District Court’s decision 
upholding the punitive damages award. CGB Occupational 
Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 184, 189, 
193 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Inter Med. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI 
Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446, 468 (3d Cir. 1999)). More 
particularly, we must determine “whether the punitive 
damage award is so ‘grossly disproportional’ to [Intertek’s] 
conduct as to amount to a constitutional violation.” Willow 
Inn, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 399 F.3d 224, 230 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (quoting Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 434). 
 The Due Process Clause “prohibits a State from 
imposing a ‘grossly excessive’ punishment on a tortfeasor.” 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996) 
(citing TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 
454 (1993)). The Supreme Court has established three 
guideposts to determine whether a punitive damages award 
was grossly excessive: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of 
the defendant’s actions; (2) the disparity between the harm or 
potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and its punitive 
damages award; and (3) the difference between the punitive 
damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed 
in comparable cases. Gore, 517 U.S. at 574–75. The District 
Court did not, and we will not, address the third 
consideration, as it would be unhelpful because there are not 
comparable cases with civil penalties for negligent 
misrepresentation. See CGB Occupational, 499 F.3d at 189–
90 (noting that the third subfactor was “not instructive here” 
and declining to address it); Inter Med. Supplies, 181 F.3d at 
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468 (finding the third guidepost “unhelpful” in evaluating 
punitive damages for tortious interference and related 
common law torts). We therefore focus on the first two 
factors: the reprehensibility of Intertek’s conduct and the 
disparity between the compensatory and punitive damages 
awards. 
 The reprehensibility of Intertek’s conduct is “[p]erhaps 
the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a 
punitive damages award.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 575. Because it’s 
so important to this analysis, the Supreme Court has provided 
further detail on this guidepost, instructing courts to consider 
the extent to which the following subfactors are satisfied: 
[1] the harm caused was physical as opposed to 
economic; [2] the tortious conduct evinced an 
indifference to or reckless disregard of the 
health or safety of others; [3] the target of the 
conduct had financial vulnerability; [4] the 
conduct involved repeated actions or was an 
isolated incident; and [5] the harm was the 
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, 
or mere accident. 
CGB Occupational, 499 F.3d at 190 (quoting State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003)). 
We also have indicated that a plaintiff’s improper conduct 
may be relevant. See Inter Med. Supplies, 181 F.3d at 467 
(noting that the fact that the plaintiff had breached contracts 
and engaged in tortious acts was “[a]nother factor that tends 
to mitigate the need for a high punitive damages award”).  
 The District Court found that the first subfactor 
weighed in favor of Intertek; the second, third, and fourth 
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subfactors weighed in favor of Brand; and the fifth subfactor 
had a neutral effect. Intertek argues that all five subfactors, 
plus Brand’s purportedly wrongful conduct, favor it. Most of 
Intertek’s arguments amount to quibbles with the District 
Court’s factual determinations, which we cannot disturb 
unless they are clearly erroneous. CGB Occupational, 499 
F.3d at 189. In that vein, it argues that the District Court erred 
by concluding that (1) Intertek acted recklessly (subfactor 
two); (2) Brand was financially vulnerable (subfactor three); 
and (3) Intertek repeatedly performed sloppy testing work 
(subfactor four). 
 Our review of the trial record leads us to conclude that 
none of these factual determinations was clearly erroneous. 
There was evidence that Intertek acted recklessly—including, 
especially, Curkeet’s testimony. See supra Part III.C.2. The 
District Court supported its finding of financial vulnerability 
by noting that neither David Brand nor his company could 
pay the Ace judgment because the company was so reliant on 
the Ace contract that the deal’s collapse left Brand teetering 
on the edge of financial ruin. Brand Mktg. Grp., 2014 WL 
2094297, at *18. And the District Court’s finding of repeated 
misconduct was supported by Curkeet’s testimony, which 
included statements about Intertek’s incomplete testing 
process and previous breakdowns. See supra Part I.B. We 
therefore reject Intertek’s fact-based arguments regarding 
reprehensibility. 
 In addition to its factual claims, Intertek makes a legal 
argument with respect to the second subfactor. The District 
Court found that Intertek’s actions showed reckless disregard 
of Brand’s rights and consumers’ health and safety, as faulty 
testing of malfunctioning heaters could place consumers in 
serious danger. Intertek argues that the District Court erred in 
 30 
 
considering potential harms to consumers rather than harm to 
Brand alone. That consideration, it argues, ran afoul of the 
Supreme Court’s admonition that punitive damage awards not 
be used “to punish and deter conduct that [bears] no relation 
to [the plaintiff’s] harm.” State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422. 
 This issue—whether courts may consider harm to the 
public, rather than harm to the plaintiff only—is not settled by 
precedent. State Farm provides the most pertinent Supreme 
Court pronouncement on the issue. In that case, a Utah jury 
awarded a plaintiff $145 million in punitive damages (against 
$1 million in compensatory damages) in a suit against State 
Farm for fraud, bad faith, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. Id. at 412–14. After the trial court reduced 
the punitive award to $25 million, the Utah Supreme Court 
reinstated the $145 million award pursuant to its application 
of Gore’s three-pronged analysis. Id. at 415. 
 In reinstating the award, the Utah Court relied “in 
large part” on evidence of State Farm’s corporate policy of 
denying or capping insurance claims to meet fiscal goals, 
even though doing so was not in their customers’ best 
interests and was sometimes fraudulent. Id. at 415–16. 
“Evidence pertaining to [this policy] concerned State Farm’s 
business practices for over 20 years in numerous States. Most 
of these practices bore no relation to . . . the type of claim 
underlying the [plaintiffs’] complaint against the company.” 
Id. at 415. The Supreme Court reversed, applying the Gore 
factors and holding that the punitive damages award was “an 
irrational and arbitrary deprivation” of State Farm’s property. 
Id. at 429. 
 The Supreme Court held that the Utah Supreme Court 
should not have “condemned [State Farm] for its nationwide 
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policies rather than for the conduct directed toward the 
[plaintiffs].” Id. at 420. Those policies, while unsavory, were 
dissimilar to the conduct at issue and occurred in states 
outside Utah, where the conduct may not have been illegal. 
Id. at 420–21. Federalism principles, the Court noted, 
counseled against allowing Utah to penalize out-of-state 
conduct that other states permitted—“each State alone can 
determine what measure of punishment, if any, to impose on 
a defendant who acts within its jurisdiction.” Id. at 422. 
 As important as federalism was to the Supreme 
Court’s decision, it stated that the punitive damages award 
was constitutionally improper “[f]or a more fundamental 
reason . . . : The [Utah] courts awarded punitive damages to 
punish and deter conduct that bore no relation to the 
[plaintiffs’] harm. A defendant’s dissimilar acts, independent 
from the acts upon which liability was premised, may not 
serve as the basis for punitive damages.” Id. The Due Process 
Clause, the Court stated, “does not permit courts, in the 
calculation of punitive damages, to adjudicate the merits of 
other parties’ hypothetical claims against a defendant under 
the guise of the reprehensibility analysis.” Id. at 423. 
 State Farm thus shows that, although courts may 
consider other instances of misconduct by the defendant in 
evaluating a punitive damages award, that conduct must be 
“of the [same] sort” as the conduct that injured the plaintiff. 
Id. Intertek argues that, by considering harm to the public 
rather than harm to Brand alone, the District Court violated 
this mandate, especially because “no one—and certainly not 
Brand or his company—was physically injured from Brand’s 
products.” Intertek Br. 54. 
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 Intertek overreads State Farm. That decision does not 
prohibit the consideration of potential public harm in addition 
to the plaintiff’s injury. It prohibits only the consideration of 
conduct that is unrelated to the plaintiff’s case. Unlike the 
companywide policies in State Farm—which spanned two 
decades, many states, and a wide variety of actual conduct—
Intertek’s actions in this case involved one series of incidents: 
its negligent communications to Brand about the 
Thermablaster testing. The District Court didn’t consider, for 
example, testing errors that occurred at different Intertek 
facilities and involved different products over the course of 
many years—something that would have run afoul of State 
Farm—but instead focused only on the misconduct related 
directly to this case. The fact that the harm may have 
expanded beyond Brand’s own harm doesn’t matter because 
the District Court correctly focused only on the conduct at 
issue without considering “independent” harms.4 
 Moreover, unlike the widespread public harm 
considered in State Farm (which had no conceivable 
connection to the plaintiffs in that case other than the fact that 
State Farm inflicted it), the potential public harm here is 
directly tied to Brand. As the creator and seller of the heaters, 
Brand surely would have been sued by any person injured by 
a Thermablaster. The company would have been vulnerable 
                                                 
 4 The fact that no one was physically injured by the 
Thermablasters is unimportant. What matters is that Intertek 
acted in reckless disregard of the risk of harm; that the risk 
did not come to fruition is a product of chance for which 
Intertek should not be rewarded. And the District Court’s 
determination that there was evidence of recklessness vis-à-
vis public safety was not clearly erroneous. See supra Part 
III.C.2. 
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to dozens of lawsuits and perhaps millions of dollars in 
liability if the heaters in fact caused harm to the public. Thus, 
potential harm to the public was necessarily potential harm to 
Brand, and Intertek does not dispute that harm to Brand 
should be considered in this analysis.  
 “Punitive damages may properly be imposed to further 
a State’s legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct 
and deterring its repetition.” Gore, 517 U.S. at 568. The 
District Court’s consideration of potential public harms—
which were integrally related to Brand’s harm—furthered that 
interest. State Farm instructs that a court may not search far 
and wide for unrelated instances of wrongful conduct by a 
defendant. But neither should a court wear blinders in 
conducting a due process analysis, remaining purposely 
oblivious to all harmful effects of a defendant’s conduct that 
do not directly befall the plaintiff, even when those harms 
arise from the precise conduct at issue.  
 In sum, because the potential harm to the public in this 
case did not arise from the “defendant’s dissimilar acts, 
independent from the acts upon which liability was 
premised,” we hold that the District Court did not err in 
considering it. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 422.  
 As for the disparity between the compensatory and 
punitive awards, Intertek calculates the ratio between the two 
based on the compensatory award it thinks should have been 
given: $320,368. If that were the compensatory award, the 
punitive-to-compensatory ratio would have been greater than 
15:1. But the actual compensatory damages award we upheld 
($1,045,000) yields a ratio of less than 5:1. Although the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly “decline[d] . . . to impose a 
bright-line ratio” for due process purposes, “[s]ingle-digit 
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multipliers are more likely to comport with due process, 
while still achieving the State’s goals of deterrence and 
retribution, than awards with [significantly higher ratios].” Id. 
at 425. In light of our analysis of the reprehensibility 
guidepost, a 5:1 ratio is not the type of gross disparity 
between compensatory and punitive damages that renders a 
punitive award suspect by itself. 
 Thus, both analytical guideposts indicate that the 
punitive damages award in this case did not violate due 
process. We will affirm the District Court’s decision 
regarding punitive damages. 
D 
 Intertek’s final argument is that a new trial is 
warranted because the jury’s verdicts—on Brand’s claim for 
negligent misrepresentation and Intertek’s counterclaim for 
trademark infringement—were inconsistent. It argues that the 
jury could not rationally have concluded both that Intertek’s 
misrepresentations caused Brand’s injury and that Brand 
infringed on Intertek’s trademark. “We review the district 
court’s order ruling on a motion for a new trial for abuse of 
discretion unless the court’s denial is based on the application 
of a legal precept, in which case the standard of review is 
plenary.” Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 
1167 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 According to Intertek, Brand’s infringement—which 
occurred when the company emblazoned the Thermablaster 
boxes with Intertek’s seal of approval prior to receiving 
permission to do so—would have caused Brand the same 
injury it suffered even if Intertek had not committed any 
misrepresentation, so Brand’s conduct was a legally 
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superseding cause of its own loss. As a result, it argues, the 
District Court’s denial of Intertek’s motion for a new trial was 
an abuse of discretion. 
 But Intertek does not explain how, if it had not 
negligently misrepresented that the Thermablasters met the 
ANSI standard, Brand’s infringement would have caused the 
same injury Brand actually suffered. In a parallel universe 
where Intertek’s Test Data Sheet correctly indicated that the 
heaters did not comply with the standard, David Brand 
testified that he would have sought to rectify the problem. 
Brand therefore would not have provided Ace with faulty 
heaters, and Ace would have had no reason to demand its 
money back and eventually obtain a judgment against Brand. 
Although Brand would have incurred some incremental costs, 
it would not have suffered the same injury even if it still 
infringed on Intertek’s mark. Instead, it would have 
committed trademark infringement and possibly owed some 
damages to Intertek, but it would not have lost its Ace-related 
profits. 
 It is possible that, in that parallel universe, Brand 
would have ignored Intertek’s warnings that the 
Thermablasters did not meet the safety standard and would 
have proceeded to sell them to Ace anyway (while still using 
Intertek’s certification mark without permission). Brand 
might then have suffered the same injury even absent 
Intertek’s misrepresentation. But it’s not for us to give 
credence to such a hypothetical version of events, “[f]or a 
search for one possible view of the case which will make the 
jury’s finding inconsistent results in a collision with the 
Seventh Amendment.” Atl. & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. 
Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962). Rather, we 
must affirm the District Court unless there is no possible way 
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to reconcile the jury’s verdicts. See id.; cf. Gallick v. Balt. & 
Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119 (1963) (“[I]t is the duty of 
the courts to attempt to harmonize the answers [to special 
interrogatories], if it is possible under a fair reading of 
them . . . .”). The District Court did not abuse its discretion.  
IV 
 For the reasons stated, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court denying Intertek’s post-trial motion. 
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FISHER, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part. 
 I join all but Sections III-C-2 and III-C-3 of the 
opinion of the Court. I part ways with the majority on the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
punitive damages jury instruction. I believe the majority 
misapplies the standard for punitive damages under 
Pennsylvania law and, in so doing, unduly waters down the 
necessary showing to support a punitive award.  
 Punitive damages are an “extreme remedy.” Martin v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 494 A.2d 1088, 1098 n.14 (Pa. 1985) 
(plurality opinion), abrogated on other grounds by Kirkbride 
v. Lisbon Contractors, Inc., 555 A.2d 800 (Pa. 1989). They 
“are penal in nature and are proper only in cases where the 
defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate 
willful, wanton[,] or reckless conduct.” Hutchison ex rel. 
Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005). As noted 
correctly by the majority, for reckless conduct to support a 
punitive award, the plaintiff must show “that (1) a defendant 
had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the 
plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act . . . 
in conscious disregard of that risk.” Id. at 772. Grossly 
negligent conduct is insufficient. Martin, 494 A.2d at 1098. 
So, as stated by the majority, to affirm the District Court’s 
decision to instruct the jury on punitive damages, “we must 
find evidence in the record that Intertek actually knew its 
conduct was placing Brand at risk of harm.” Maj. Op. 24.  
 Put simply, I believe the evidence in this case does not 
justify a punitive damages award. Like the majority, I believe 
Frederick Curkeet’s testimony is vital. I agree further that 
Curkeet’s testimony shows that Intertek understood its 
important role of preventing unsafe products from reaching 
the marketplace and that companies and consumers alike 
relied on Intertek to perform this role properly. But Intertek’s 
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knowledge of this general risk of harm is not enough; the 
evidence must show that Intertek knew its specific conduct in 
this case placed Brand at risk of harm. See generally Martin, 
494 A.2d at 1099–1100 (holding that knowledge of general 
safety risks posed by asbestos was not enough to show 
subjective appreciation of the specific risks faced by 
insulation workers installing asbestos). I also acknowledge 
that Curkeet testified to instances where Intertek engineers 
had made “pretty major mistakes” and “slack[ed] off on the 
job and sa[id] things complied without running the test,” App. 
841–42, but I note the absence of any specifics regarding the 
nature and circumstances of these mistakes. The majority 
attempts to fill this absence, but I think it requires us to 
reverse. 
 The majority overstates much of Curkeet’s testimony. 
First, the majority relies on Curkeet’s admission that Intertek 
did not always have “best practice documents,” i.e., one set of 
forms used by every Intertek lab that spelled out specifically 
how to run a particular safety test, and instead sometimes 
relied on labs to create their own forms locally for a specific 
test. App. 802. This testimony may show that Intertek knew 
that it was not perfect (what company is?) and had room to 
improve (what company doesn’t?), but it does not show that 
Intertek knew that relying on labs in some cases to create 
their own forms placed Brand at risk of harm. The majority 
speculates that “problems had arisen in the past as a result” of 
these “testing process . . . holes,” Maj. Op. 26, but Curkeet 
never testified that the lack of standard forms had ever caused 
the kinds of mistakes that occurred in this case. The lack of 
rigorous uniformity does not equate to recklessness, and if an 
admission of imperfection or lack of absolute uniformity 
opens the door to punitive damages whenever something goes 
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wrong, Pennsylvania companies may be in for a rude 
awakening.    
 Nor do I agree with the majority that the punitive 
damages instruction is supported by Intertek’s decision to test 
the Thermablasters in China using standards written in 
English. The majority relies on Curkeet’s admission that 
Intertek’s Chinese engineers had “‘obvious’” problems with 
the English language. Maj. Op. 25. What Curkeet actually 
said, however, was far more innocent. He said that Intertek’s 
Chinese engineers “are essentially trained in engineering in 
English for the most part”; that “their knowledge of English, 
written English and technical English[,] is actually very 
good”; and that “they certainly have the training to deal with 
[the] English language in engineering functions,” though they 
may not write English as easily as native speakers. App. 800–
01. As for the decision not to translate the standards into 
Chinese, Curkeet explained that Intertek decided it was better 
for Chinese engineers to work with English standards based 
on its assessment that the “specific terminology” in the 
English safety standards would not “translate to Chinese . . . 
very well.” App. 801. He also said that, in his experience, the 
Chinese engineers “have been very able” to deal with English 
safety standards. Id. So although Curkeet admitted it was 
“obvious” that English was not the Chinese engineers’ first 
language, nothing in his testimony suggests that Intertek 
knew that it placed Brand at risk of harm by having Chinese 
engineers apply English standards.  
 The majority finds additional evidence of Intertek’s 
reckless conduct because, according to the majority, this was 
not a “one-time issue” given Curkeet’s testimony about 
engineers slacking off and failing to correctly run tests. Maj. 
Op. 25. But again, Curkeet never said what these past 
mistakes entailed and certainly never said they involved 
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translation issues, so these prior bad experiences do not show 
that Intertek subjectively appreciated a risk of harm created 
by any translation issues here. Additionally, in rejecting 
Intertek’s argument that it chose not to translate the safety 
standards from English to Chinese to avoid “‘lost jargon,’” 
the majority concludes that Intertek’s choice actually shows 
that Intertek subjectively appreciated the risk of harm to 
Brand from any language issues. Maj. Op. 25 n.4. I disagree. 
If anything, it shows that Intertek decided a risk existed 
(perhaps incorrectly) and avoided it, not the other way 
around. I therefore fail to see where the evidence is that 
Intertek knew that it placed Brand at risk of harm by having 
Chinese engineers interpret English standards. 
 Finally, the majority finds support for the punitive 
damages instruction in Curkeet’s acknowledgment that the 
safety standard at issue was new and complex, yet the testing 
proceeded without Curkeet’s direct supervision or 
instructions. I might agree with the majority if Curkeet 
testified that he knew at the time that he needed to instruct the 
engineers to seek his personal help to interpret this standard 
or that Intertek had any prior bad experiences testing to new 
safety standards. But Curkeet only said he would do things 
differently in retrospect and never mentioned any prior bad 
experiences with new standards, instead noting that Intertek 
“regularly” worked with new standards. App. 855.  
 In sum, Brand pursued a negligence claim and 
presented sufficient evidence to support that claim. Although 
Pennsylvania law permitted Brand to go the extra mile by 
proving not just negligence but outrageous conduct to support 
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a punitive damages award, see Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 772, I 
simply believe Brand came up short.1    
 I respectfully dissent.  
                                              
1 Because I conclude that the evidence was insufficient 
for the District Court to instruct the jury on punitive damages, 
I would not reach Intertek’s constitutional challenge to the 
punitive damages award.      
